# Imperialism

**Obama’s political posturing over Guantanamo proves that aff reforms are an Imperial smokescreen. Only a radical overhaul will solve.**

**ICL 2013** (“Vietnam, Central America, Iraq, Guantánamo: U.S. Imperialism’s Machinery of Torture,” May 17 2013, Workers Vanguard 1024 <http://www.icl-fi.org/print/english/wv/1024/torture.html>)

Eighty-six of the remaining 166 detainees had been cleared for release years ago. The rest, as the New Yorker noted, “are roughly divided between those the Administration says it might bestir itself to bring a case against someday, and those it acknowledges it doesn’t have enough evidence against, but finds somehow unsettling, and so is locking up anyway.” The Guantánamo prisoners, many indiscriminately rounded up by the U.S. military around 2002 or sold to their captors by local forces for bounty, were from the outset physically brutalized and subjected to intense psychological torment and humiliation designed to break them. These desperate men fear they will never get out alive. We demand: Free the detainees now! With his liberal supporters wringing their hands over the hunger strikes, President Obama briefly rediscovered his old campaign promise to close Guantánamo, citing concerns on April 30 that “it is expensive, it is inefficient, it hurts us in terms of our international standing.” While Obama cynically blames Congress for supposedly tying his hands, his plan to close Guantánamo was never a plan to end the system of indefinite detention, only to relocate it onto American soil. The top Pentagon official for detainee policy recently told the New York Times that, even if Congress dropped its restrictions on transferring the detainees, “I don’t believe the numbers would change radically” (24 April). Indeed, a year before Congress imposed the restrictions, Obama barred repatriations to Yemen, home of the majority of the detainees cleared for release. Meanwhile, the military has spent millions of dollars in recent years on a state-of-the-art courthouse at Guantánamo, housing for lawyers and guards, and other construction. The Pentagon is requesting nearly $200 million more for further upgrades. But at the same time it’s true that Obama is taking few prisoners, preferring assassinations by drones and special operations forces. Over 3,000 people have been slaughtered in drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. These include “signature strikes,” e.g., targeting groups of “military-aged males” in a region under surveillance. Obama has also authorized the expansion of covert operations into countries across the Near East, the Horn of Africa, Central Asia and beyond. The torture, assassinations and other barbaric practices meted out daily in the name of the “war on terror” have always been features of U.S. imperialism. In fact, many of the torture techniques its forces use today harken back to those employed at the turn of the 20th century to suppress the heroic uprising against the U.S. occupation of the Philippines. Up to half a million Filipinos were slaughtered, and men, women and children were herded into concentration camps. In the imperialist epoch, the major capitalist powers—which compete with each other in exploiting dependent and economically backward countries—have built up massive military arsenals. At the top of the heap is the American bourgeoisie, the most powerful terrorists on the planet. The U.S. rulers have dropped atomic bombs to incinerate civilians in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, napalmed Vietnamese villages and engineered Central American dirty wars to smash popular uprisings of leftist insurgents. As long as these butchers remain in power, there will be no end to the carnage. Only smashing U.S. imperialism from within through victorious workers revolution can put it out of its bloodthirsty business.

Imperialist domination empirically outweighs visible war and makes extinction inevitable

Eckhardt 90 (William, Lentz Peace Research Laboratory of St. Louis, JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH, February 1990, p. 15-16)

Modern Western Civilization used war as well as peace to gain the whole world as a domain to benefit itself at the expense of others: The expansion of the culture and institutions of modern civilization from its centers in Europe was made possible by imperialistic war… It is true missionaries and traders had their share in the work of expanding world civilization, but always with the support, immediate or in the background, of armies and navies (pp. 251-252). The importance of dominance as a primary motive in civilized war in general was also emphasized for modern war in particular: '[Dominance] is probably the most important single element in the causation of major modern wars' (p. 85). European empires were thrown up all over the world in this process of benefiting some at the expense of others, which was characterized by armed violence contributing to structural violence: 'World-empire is built by conquest and maintained by force… Empires are primarily organizations of violence' (pp. 965, 969). 'The struggle for empire has greatly increased the disparity between states with respect to the political control of resources, since there can never be enough imperial territory to provide for all' (p. 1190). This 'disparity between states', not to mention the disparity within states, both of which take the form of racial differences in life expectancies, **has killed 15-20 times as many people in the 20th century** as have wars and revolutions (Eckhardt & Kohler, 1980; Eckhardt, 1983c). When this structural violence of 'disparity between states' created by civilization is taken into account, then the violent nature of civilization becomes much more apparent. Wright concluded that 'Probably at least 10 per cent of deaths in modern civilization can be attributed directly or indirectly to war… The trend of war has been toward greater cost, both absolutely and relative to population… The proportion of the population dying as a direct consequence of battle has tended to increase' (pp. 246, 247). So far as structural violence has constituted about one-third of all deaths in the 20th century (Eckhardt & Kohler, 1980; Eckhardt, 1983c), and so far as structural violence was a function of armed violence, past and present, then Wright's estimate was very conservative indeed. Assuming that war is some function of civilization, then civilization is responsible for one-third of 20th century deaths. This is surely self-destruction carried to a high level of efficiency. The structural situation has been improving throughout the 20th century, however, so that structural violence caused 'only' 20% of all deaths in 1980 (Eckhardt, 1983c). There is obviously room for more improvement. To be sure, armed violence in the form of revolution has been directed toward the reduction of structural violence, even as armed violence in the form of imperialism has been directed toward its maintenance. But imperial violence came first**, in the sense of creating structural violence,** before revolutionary violence emerged to reduce it. It is in this sense that structural violence was basically, fundamentally, and primarily a function of armed violence in its imperial form. The atomic age has ushered in the possibility, and some would say the probability, of killing not only some of us for the benefit of others, nor even of killing all of us to no one's benefit, but of putting an end to life itself! This is surely carrying self-destruction to some infinite power beyond all human comprehension. It's too much, or superfluous, as the Existentialists might say. Why we should care is a mystery. But, if we do, then the need for civilized peoples to respond to the ethical challenge is very urgent indeed. Life itself may depend upon our choice.

Vote negative to question the epistemological foundations of empire. US neo-imperialism sustains itself by controlling the boundaries of knowledge. Only exposing the epistemic violence of imperialism and addressing the needs of the oppressed can solve.

McLaren and Kincheloe in 5 (Peter Professor of Education, Graduate School of Education and Information Studies @ UCLA and Joe, professor and Canada Research Chair at the Faculty of Education, McGill University in Montreal, Quebec, Canada. The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research, Third Edition, Eds Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln)

In this context, it is important to note that we understand a social theory as a map or a guide to the social sphere. In a research context, it does not determine how we see the world but helps us devise questions and strategies for exploring it. A critical social theory is concerned in particular with issues of power and justice and the ways that the economy; matters of race, class, and gender; ideologies; discourses; education; religion and other social institutions; and cultural dynamics interact to construct a social system (Beck-Gernsheim, Butler, & Puigvert, 2003; Flccha, Gomez, & Puigvert, 2003). Thus, in this context we seek to provide a view of an evolving criticality or a reconceptualized critical theory. Critical theory is never static; it is always evolving, changing in light of both new theoretical insights and new problems and social circumstances. The list of concepts elucidating our articulation of critical theory indicates a criticality informed by a variety of discourses emerging after the work of the Frankfurt School Indeed, some of the theoretical discourses, while referring to themselves as critical, directly call into question some of the work of Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse. Thus, diverse theoretical traditions have informed our understanding of criticality and have demanded understanding of diverse forms of oppression including class, race, gender, sexual, cultural, religious, colonial, and ability-related concerns. The evolving notion of criticality we present is informed by, while critiquing, the post-discourses—for example, postmodernism, poststructuralism, and postcolonialism. In this context, critical theorists become detectives of new theoretical insights, perpetually searching for new and interconnected ways of understanding power and oppression and the ways they shape everyday life and human experience. In this context, criticality and the research it supports are always evolving, always encountering new ways to irritate dominant forms of power, to provide more evocative and compelling insights. Operating in this way, an evolving criticality is always vulnerable to exclusion from the domain of approved modes of research. The forms of social change it supports always position it in some places as an outsider, an awkward detective always interested in uncovering social structures, discourses, ideologies, and epistemologies that prop up both the status quo and a variety of forms of privilege. In the epistemological domain, white, male, class elitist, heterosexist, imperial, and colonial privilege often operates by asserting the power to claim objectivity and neutrality. Indeed, the owners of such privilege often own the "franchise" on reason and rationality. Proponents of an evolving criticality possess a variety of tools to expose such oppressive power politics. Such proponents assert that critical theory is well-served by drawing upon numerous liberatory discourses and including diverse groups of marginalized peoples and their allies in the nonhierarchical aggregation of critical analysts {Bello, 2003; Clark, 2002; Humphries, 1997). In the present era, emerging forms of neocolonialism and neo-imperialism in the United States move critical theorists to examine the wavs American power operates under the cover of establishing democracies all over the world. Advocates of an evolving criticality argue—as we do in more detail later in this chapter—that such neocolonial power must be exposed so it can be opposed in the United States and around the world. The American Empires justification in the name of freedom for undermining democratically elected governments from Iran (Kincheloe, 2004), Chile, Nicaragua, and Venezuela to Liberia (when its real purpose is to acquire geopolitical advantage for future military assaults, economic leverage in international markets, and access to natural resources) must be exposed by critical-ists for what it is—a rank imperialist sham (McLaren, 2003a, 2003b; McLaren & Jaramillo, 2002; McLaren & Martin, 2003). Critical researchers need to view their work in the context of living and working in a nation-state with the most powerful military-industrial complex in history that is shamefully using the terrorist attacks of September 11 to advance a ruthless imperialist agenda fueled by capitalist accumulation by means of the rule of force (McLaren & Farahmandpur,2003). Chomsky (2003), for instance, has accused the U.S. government of the "supreme crime" of preventive war (in the case of its invasion of Iraq, the use of military force to destroy an invented or imagined threat) of the type that was condemned at Kuremburg. Others, like historian Arthur Schlesinger (cited in Chomsky, 2003), have likened the invasion of Iraq to Japan's "day of infamy'' that is, to the policy that imperial Japan employed at the time of Pearl Harbor. David G. Smith (2003) argues that such imperial dynamics are supported by particular epistemological forms. The United States is an epistemological empire based on a notion of truth that undermines the knowledges produced by those outside the good graces and benevolent authority of the empire. Thus, in the 21 st century, critical theorists must develop sophisticated ways to address not only the brute material relations of class rule linked to the mode and relations of capitalist production and imperialist conquest (whether through direct military intervention or indirectly through the creation of client states) but also the epistemological violence that helps discipline the world Smith refers to this violence as a form of "information warfare" that spreads deliberate falsehoods about countries such as Iraq and Iran. U.S. corporate and governmental agents become more sophisticated in the use of such episto-weaponry with every day that passes. Obviously, an evolving criticality does not promiscuously choose theoretical discourses to add to the bricolage of critical theories. It is highly suspicious—as we detail later—of theories that fail to understand the malevolent workings of power, that fail to critique the blinders of Eurocentrism, that cultivate an elitism of insiders and outsiders, and that fail to discern a global system of inequity supported by diverse forms of ideology and violence. It is uninterested in any theory—no matter how fashionable—that does not directly address the needs of victims of oppression and the suffering they must endure. The following is an elastic, ever-evolving set of concepts included in our evolving notion of criticality. With theoretical innovations and shifting Zeitgeists, they evolve. The points that are deemed most important in one time period pale in relation to different points in a new era. <P306-307>

# OLC CP

***Txt: The Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel should issue a formal opinion that the President of the United States may not indefinitely detain in the area prescribed by the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force and the (2012/2013) National Defense Authorization Act to cases involving persons arrested and/or captured outside the territory of the United States.***

#### The President of the United States should comply with the Office of Legal Counsel’s opinion.

#### OLC opinions are presumptively binding and solve the case

Trevor Morrison 11, Professor of Law at Columbia Law School, “LIBYA, ‘HOSTILITIES,’ THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, AND THE PROCESS OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH LEGAL INTERPRETATION,” Harvard Law Review Forum Vol.124:42, http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/vol124\_forum\_morrison.pdf

Deeply rooted traditions treat the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) as the most important source of legal advice wit h- in the executive branch. A number of important norms guide the provision and handling of that advice. OLC bases its answers on its best view of the law, not merely its sense of what is plausible or arguable. 6 To ensure that it takes adequate account of competing perspectives within the executive branch, it typically requests and fully considers the views of other affected agencies before answering the questions put to it. Critically, once OLC arrives at an answer, it is treated as binding within the executive branch unless overruled by the Attorney General or the President. That power to overrule, moreover, is wielded extremely rarely — virtually never. As a result of these and related norms, and in spite of episodes like the notorious “torture memos,” OLC has earned a well-deserved reputation for providing credible, authoritative, thorough and objective legal analysis. The White House is one of the main beneficiaries of that reputation. When OLC concludes that a government action is lawful, its conclusion carries a legitimacy that other executive offices cannot so readily provide. That legitimacy is a function of OLC’s deep traditions and unique place within the executive branch. Other executive offices — be they agency general counsels or the White House Counsel’s Office — do not have decades-long traditions of providing legal advice based on their best view of the law after fully considering the competing positions; they have not generated bodies of authoritative precedents to inform and constrain their work; and they do not issue legal opinions that, whether or not they favor the President , are treated as presumptively binding within the executive branch. (Nor should those other offices mimic OLC; that is not their job.) Because the value of a favorable legal opinion from OLC is tied inextricably to these aspects of its work, each successive presidential administration has a strong incentive to respect and preserve them.

#### Solves compliance but maintains flex

HLR 12, Harvard Law Review, Presidential Power and the Office of Legal Counsel, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 2090

As Professor Richard Pildes points out in his critique of their book, though, "willingness to follow OLC interpretations would seem to be the quintessential kind of executive self-binding constraint that Posner and Vermeule otherwise advocate as critical to presidential credibility." n61 Indeed, the President could self-interestedly announce that, because an independent OLC would provide him with a relatively unbiased view of the law, he is pledging to follow its advice in the vast majority of cases. Legally, the President would remain free to weigh OLC's opinion against the advice provided by the White House Counsel or cabinet officials, and he would retain the power to reject any OLC opinion with which he disagreed or which he believed would [\*2100] harm national security or other vital interests if followed. Informally, however, he would face political and reputational costs if he decided to go back on his pledge and substitute his own judgment for that of OLC, n62 costs made even more substantial as a result of the White House's reliance on OLC's reputation to legitimate some of its key legal positions. The stigma attached to disregarding OLC's advice n63 would thus constitute a meaningful limit on the President, particularly if public opinion plays a role in constraining the President, n64 because he would be discouraged from deviating from OLC's view unless he were willing to spend a significant amount of political capital. Thus, if OLC's internal safeguards work correctly, the President will have a strong incentive to follow a (relatively) impartial view of the law while nevertheless retaining the flexibility, in times of need, to determine the meaning of the law for himself.

# Iran Strikes DA

Syria proves to Iran that Obama can credibly negotiate with military force or diplomacy – this flex lets him negotiate an end to Iran’s nuclear weapons program

Benen, writer for MSNBC and producer of the Rachel Maddow show, 9/20/2013

(Steve, “When crises become opportunities,” <http://maddowblog.msnbc.com/_news/2013/09/20/20599445-when-crises-become-opportunities?lite>)

When it comes to the Middle East, progress has never moved in a straight line. There are fits and starts, ebbs and flows. There are heartening breakthroughs and crushing disappointments, occasionally at the same time. That said, while the domestic political establishment's attention seems focused elsewhere, there's reason to believe new opportunities are materializing in the region in ways that were hard to even imagine up until very recently. This morning, for example, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) announced that Syria has taken its first steps towards detailing its stockpiles. Michael Luhan, a spokesperson for the Hague-based chemical weapons regulator, said in a statement, "The OPCW has received an initial disclosure from the Syrian Government of its chemical weapons programme, which is now being examined by the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation." Meanwhile, Iranian President Hasan Rouhani has a new op-ed in the Washington Post arguing that the United States and the rest of the world "must work together to end the unhealthy rivalries and interferences that fuel violence and drive us apart" through a policy of "constructive engagement." The New York Times added that Iranian leaders, "seizing on perceived flexibility in a private letter from President Obama, have decided to gamble on forging a swift agreement over their nuclear program with the goal of ending crippling sanctions." David Sanger summarized the bigger picture nicely. Only two weeks after Washington and the nation were debating a unilateral military strike on Syria that was also intended as a forceful warning to Iran about its nuclear program, President Obama finds himself at the opening stages of two unexpected diplomatic initiatives with America's biggest adversaries in the Middle East, each fraught with opportunity and danger. Without much warning, diplomacy is suddenly alive again after a decade of debilitating war in the region. After years of increasing tension with Iran, there is talk of finding a way for it to maintain a face-saving capacity to produce a very limited amount of nuclear fuel while allaying fears in the United States and Israel that it could race for a bomb. The surprising progress has come so suddenly that a senior American diplomat described this week's developments as "head spinning." So what happens next? The consensus among many foreign policy observers is that developments in Syria and Iran are linked in ways that may or may not be helpful to the United States. Max Fisher explained well yesterday that President Obama's pragmatism "has sent exactly the right signals to Iran, particularly at this very sensitive moment." Obama has been consistently clear, even if some members of his administration were not, that his big overriding goal is for Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad to stop using chemical weapons. First he was going to do that with strikes, meant to coerce Assad. Then, in response to the Russian proposal, Obama signaled he would back off the strikes if Assad gave up his chemical weapons, which is exactly what Obama has always said he wants. He's been consistent as well as flexible, which gave Assad big incentives to cooperate when he might have otherwise dug in his heels. There are some awfully significant -- and promising -- parallels here with the U.S. standoff with Iran. Obama has been clear that he wants Iran to give up its rogue uranium-enrichment program and submit to the kind of rigorous inspections that would guarantee that its nuclear program is peaceful. He's also been clear that the United States is using severe economic sanctions to coerce Tehran to cooperate and that it would use military force if necessary. The implicit (and sometimes explicit) message to Iran has been: If you abandon your enrichment program, we'll make it worth your while by easing off. Here's where the parallel with Syria is really important: Iranian leaders distrust the United States deeply and fear that Obama would betray them by not holding up his end of the bargain. That's been a major hurdle to any U.S.-Iran nuclear deal. But seeing Assad's deal with Obama work out (so far) sends the message to Iran that it can trust the United States. It also sends the message that making concessions to the United States can pay off. Iran's supreme leader has been talking a lot lately about flexibility and diplomacy toward the West. So it's an ideal moment for Obama to be demonstrating flexibility and diplomacy toward the Middle East.

**Plan guts Obama’s military credibility and kills negotiations**

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The last four years should have been a good period for executive-congressional relations in the areas of national security and foreign affairs. The president, vice president, and secretary of state were former Senators. They all viewed President George W. Bush as too inclined to bypass or ignore Congress and they promised to do better. And the Obama administration started with Democratic majorities in the House and Senate. It is thus surprising that the past four years have been notable for inter-branch clashes and paralysis on some major national security agenda items, with the administration failing to engage Congress or operating in a slowly reactive mode, while many congressional Republicans remain in an obstructionist mode. In the second term, the Obama administration will need to pick its legislative priorities more deliberately, engage with allies and opponents in Congress more actively, and be willing to negotiate compromises or wage aggressive campaigns on key issues. Congress has repeatedly stifled the president’s signature counterterrorism promise to close the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. Congress’s opposition has been more than political. Beginning with legislation in 2010 when Democrats controlled both houses of Congress, Congress has consistently placed legal barriers on the president’s ability to transfer Guantanamo detainees or to try them in civilian courts in the United States. After hinting in his speech at the National Archives in 2009 that he would work with Congress on these issues, Obama has put forward no proposal of his own, nor has his administration been willing to explore possible compromises on long-term Guantanamo policies, instead playing defense against moves by congressional blocs with their own Guantanamo agendas. That defensive strategy has included a series of veto threats, which were always abandoned in the end and now carry little credibility. With regard to war powers, the administration barely escaped a significant congressional rebuke after it failed to obtain congressional authorization for the operations in Libya in 2011 or at least to advance a convincing account for why such authorization was not needed. The administration conducted international diplomacy effectively, and obtained UN Security Council and Arab League endorsement of military operations to protect Libyan civilians from slaughter. However, on the domestic front it alienated even congressional supporters of its policy with poor early consultation on the Hill. In the end, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid prevented the Senate from taking up a resolution passed by the Foreign Relations Committee that would have authorized the operation but rejected the administration’s strained interpretation of the War Powers Resolution. Throughout the Libya crisis, the administration’s approach toward Congress was passive and tentative. It was fortunate for the administration that Congress was splintered and few members were willing to defend its institutional prerogatives, at least within the limited timeframe of the intervention. But Obama might not be so lucky the next time. As to treaties, the administration garnered super-majority Senate advice and consent on a record-low number of agreements in its first term. Despite a strong effort by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the Navy leadership, the administration failed to get the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Once again, part of the explanation for failure was the administration’s poorly timed and coordinated engagement of the Senate on the issue. In the face of Senate Republican portrayals of other global treaties as threats to US sovereignty, the White House failed to throw its full weight behind its valid arguments that the Law of the Sea Convention would strengthen the US position with respect, for example, to crisis hotspots in Asia and in commercial spheres. To be clear, the Obama administration has scored successes, too. For example, putting aside the policy merits, it worked reasonably well with Congress on the completed wind-down of the Iraq war. It will need to do the same with respect to the planned wind-down of the Afghanistan war and in developing a long-term strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Much of the blame for policy incoherence on many national security issues such as cybersecurity lies with Congress, which is infected by political polarization and dysfunction as much in international affairs as it is in domestic affairs. Going forward, the Obama administration will need to bring the same kind of sustained attention and hard-nosed strategic thinking to its legislative agenda on national security issues as it has on some major domestic policy issues. First, it will need to be selective in its legislative agenda and then wage aggressive campaigns on matters it labels national security priorities. It did so early in the first term with respect to the New START Treaty, which was in danger of collapse until the administration went all out for it. Obama’s team enlisted influential allies from previous Republican administrations, engaged in a serious communications campaign at the highest levels, and negotiated as necessary to get the key votes in favor of the treaty. On some issues, the administration will need to decide on a coherent policy internally and then more actively engage both its allies and opponents on Capitol Hill. One area where this will be important is the legal architecture of counterterrorism policy. It is widely understood that continuing to rely on the September 2001 congressional Authorization for Use of Military Force as the basis for detention and targeting operations is increasingly problematic as al Qaeda splinters apart and as the United States winds down combat operations in Afghanistan. The Obama administration also maintains publicly a commitment to closing Guantanamo. Yet it has not come forward with proposed legislative frameworks for dealing with these issues. Even though the president has said repeatedly that he wants to work with Congress on a more durable legal architecture for counterterrorism operations, the administration has been reactive and appears to be undecided about what, if anything, it wants from Congress. Another area in which executive-congressional relations will feature heavily is Iran’s nuclear build-up, surely one of the most delicate and complex international crises the administration will face this year. After engaging seriously only at the last minute, it has had to swallow several times congressionally-mandated sanctions that it regards as counterproductive. As the administration tries to ramp up pressure, it will need to convince skeptical members of Congress that it is applying tough diplomatic pressure on other UN Security Council members and on Iran’s trading partners. If—under the most optimistic scenarios—it reaches a satisfactory negotiated solution (or establishes a process toward one) with Iran, it will need Congress onboard; otherwise it will find its freedom to maneuver and deliver on assurances severely constrained.

**Israeli perception of a nuclear armed Iran makes a strike inevitable – that causes a regional war which escalates**

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Thucydides’ ancient logic still governs: uncertainty (over Iran’s nuclear intentions) and the fear this inspires (in Israel) increases the risk of another war (in the Middle East). Even if Israel’s response to the Iranian nuclear program does not lead the region into a war, Israel’s fears will be crucial in shaping Middle Eastern politics and will help to determine the stability of the region in the years ahead. The U.S. public has been hearing about Israeli fears of a nuclear Iran for several years. It is understandable if most Americans discount this drama as part of the background noise of international affairs a constant feature of international reporting in which the story remains the same, and the dire predictions never pan out. But it is important to pay attention to Israeli concerns about Iran for several reasons. First, Israel not only has a particular view of the threat posed by the military dimension of the Iranian nuclear program, it also has an independent means of taking action to alleviate its fears. Although Israel is less capable than the United States, if Israel were to launch strikes on Iran to set back the nuclear program, the effects would ripple across the region and beyond. Meir Dagan, former head of Israel’s external intelligence agency, the Mossad, warned a number of times that an Israeli attack on Iran would ‘‘ignite a regional war.’’1 Second, Israel’s anxieties over Iran could produce a series of defensive moves and escalating responses which spiral out of control in a manner that neither side intends. As the history of war and conflict in the Middle East from the June 1967 Six-Day War to the November 2012 round of violence between Israel and the Gaza-based Hamas reminds us, the Middle East is a tinderbox where a few sparks could all too easily ignite a major conflagration. Finally, as President Obama’s March 2013 visit to Israel demonstrated, Israel’s fears of Iran have become an inescapable and urgent concern for U.S. policy in the Middle East. Given the U.S.—Israeli friendship, President Obama will need to pay close attention to these sensitivities toward Iran. A clear understanding of Israeli perceptions of Iran will remain essential to U.S. policy toward Tehran. Israel’s fear of an Iran armed with a nuclear weapon takes at least four distinct forms, with a diverse set of sources: fear of annihilation, fear of a more difficult security environment, socioeconomic fears, and fear of a challenge to Israel’s founding ideological principles. Israelis generally frame these distinct fears as cumulative, not separate. The four layers of threat perception explain why most Israelis are willing to support their leaders’ harsh line towards Iran. However, as we show below, the various fears also hold contradictions that explain internal Israeli divisions over the required response to Iran, such as the tension between Prime Minister Netanyahu and his security establishment. Any attempt to unpack Israel’s framing of, and response to, the Iranian nuclear challenge should therefore begin with an analysis of these different fears.

# Terrorism

**No impact to terrorism – Terror attacks will only be small—not huge**

Roberts 02

Brad Roberts, member of the research staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses, and Michael Moodie, president of the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, July 2002, “Biological Weapons: Toward a Threat Reduction Strategy, Defense Horizons, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/DefHor/DH15/DH15.htm

The argument about terrorist motivation is also important. Terrorists generally have not killed as many as they have been capable of killing. This restraint seems to derive from an understanding of mass casualty attacks as both unnecessary and counterproductive. They are unnecessary because terrorists, by and large, have succeeded by conventional means. Also, they are counterproductive because they might alienate key constituencies, whether among the public, state sponsors, or the terrorist leadership group. In Brian Jenkins' famous words, terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead. Others have argued that the lack of mass casualty terrorism and effective exploitation of BW has been more a matter of accident and good fortune than capability or intent. Adherents of this view, including former Secretary of Defense William Cohen, argue that "it's not a matter of if but when." The attacks of September 11 would seem to settle the debate about whether terrorists have both the motivation and sophistication to exploit weapons of mass destruction for their full lethal effect. After all, those were terrorist attacks of unprecedented sophistication that seemed clearly aimed at achieving mass casualties--had the World Trade Center towers collapsed as the 1993 bombers had intended, perhaps as many as 150,000 would have died. Moreover, Osama bin Laden's constituency would appear to be not the "Arab street" or some other political entity but his god. And terrorists answerable only to their deity have proven historically to be among the most lethal. But this debate cannot be considered settled. Bin Laden and his followers could have killed many more on September 11 if killing as many as possible had been their primary objective. They now face the core dilemma of asymmetric warfare: how to escalate without creating new interests for the stronger power and thus the incentive to exploit its power potential more fully. Asymmetric adversaries want their stronger enemies fearful, not fully engaged--militarily or otherwise. They seek to win by preventing the stronger partner from exploiting its full potential. To kill millions in America with biological or other weapons would only commit the United States--and much of the rest of the international community--to the annihilation of the perpetrators.

No WMD terrorism- they see it as counterproductive.

Brad Roberts, Inst Dfnse Analyses, and Michael Moodie, Chem & Bio Arms Cntrl Inst, ‘2 (Defense Horizons 15, July)

The argument about terrorist motivation is also important. Terrorists generally have not killed as many as they have been capable of killing. This restraint seems to derive from an understanding of mass casualty attacks as both unnecessary and counterproductive. They are unnecessary because terrorists, by and large, have succeeded by conventional means. Also, they are counterproductive because they might alienate key constituencies, whether among the public, state sponsors, or the terrorist leadership group. In Brian Jenkins' famous words, terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead. Others have argued that the lack of mass casualty terrorism and effective exploitation of BW has been more a matter of accident and good fortune than capability or intent. Adherents of this view, including former Secretary of Defense William Cohen, argue that "it's not a matter of if but when." The attacks of September 11 would seem to settle the debate about whether terrorists have both the motivation and sophistication to exploit weapons of mass destruction for their full lethal effect. After all, those were terrorist attacks of unprecedented sophistication that seemed clearly aimed at achieving mass casualties--had the World Trade Center towers collapsed as the 1993 bombers had intended, perhaps as many as 150,000 would have died. Moreover, Osama bin Laden's constituency would appear to be not the "Arab street" or some other political entity but his god. And terrorists answerable only to their deity have proven historically to be among the most lethal. But this debate cannot be considered settled. Bin Laden and his followers could have killed many more on September 11 if killing as many as possible had been their primary objective. They now face the core dilemma of asymmetric warfare: how to escalate without creating new interests for the stronger power and thus the incentive to exploit its power potential more fully. Asymmetric adversaries want their stronger enemies fearful, not fully engaged--militarily or otherwise. They seek to win by preventing the stronger partner from exploiting its full potential. To kill millions in America with biological or other weapons would only commit the United States--and much of the rest of the international community--to the annihilation of the perpetrators.

#### hunkovic terrorism impact- says only a Taiwan war with china and u.s. will lead to extinction

**No risk of war and relations are resilient.**

**Guangqian ‘7** (Peng Guangqian, special researcher with China Institute of International Studies, 6-5-07 [CHINA POSES NO THREAT IN POST-COLD WAR WORLD, lexis]

China's military development and its defense modernization drive, which are tuned to a moderate pace, are defensive in nature. China does not challenge anyone, nor does its military strength pose a threat to anyone. In the nuclear era, it is impossible to imagine that any country could rise by resorting to military means. A wide gap exists between Chinese and US military strength. China is not foolish enough to challenge the position of Uncle Sam by using force. So, the theory that China's military power constitutes a threat to the US is at the very least based on ignorance, if not on ill intent. It is also impossible to imagine that the US could get away with using force to rob China of its right to peaceful development without paying a price in the nuclear era. In the Cold War era, the United States and the Soviet Union maintained a balance of terror based on nuclear parity. In the Post-Cold War period, nuclear parity has lost its significance in the face of the overkill power of over-stockpiled nuclear weapons. As a result, the balance of nuclear strike effects is replacing the equilibrium of nuclear strength. So, no country can emerge a victor from a nuclear confrontation. China and the US have no reason to be locked in confrontation, let alone nuclear confrontation. We should be on the alert against those with ulterior motives who are trying to lure the two countries into confrontation US Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated clearly at a news briefing on March 7 that he did not regard China as the United States' strategic foe and that engagement with China in various areas was very important. General Pace remarked, in his meeting with the leaders of China's Nanjing Military Command on March 23, that the US and China both had strong military strength but neither party wanted to go to war with the other. He went on to say that he did not see any threat from China. He also remarked that the two countries should not focus on how to fight a war but should focus on how to prevent war. This is quite to the point. Pushed by far-sighted Chinese and American politicians and military leaders, Sino-US military ties are showing signs of strong momentum. Apart from that, military leaders from both countries maintain ever closer liaison; recently high-level military visits have been frequent; and the Chinese and US navies have staged a joint maritime search-and-rescue exercise. The Chinese and US military are discussing establishing a hotline.

**US military superiority prevents nuclear use in a US/China war**

Robert S. **Ross**, Staff Writer for the National Interest, Fall, **2005** (Assessing the China Threat. The National Interest. Lexis)

At the strategic level, after decades of research and testing, China is preparing to deploy solid-fuel ballistic missiles that can target U.S. allies in East Asia and may be nearing completion of an intercontinental ballistic missile that can target the continental United States. It is also making advances in development of its next-generation submarine-launched ballistic missiles. None of these developments should come as a surprise; U.S. intelligence has been following these programs since their inception. Moreover, these programs should not be **considered a challenge** to U.S. military superiority. Once these weapons are fully operational, perhaps by the end of the decade, China will have a more credible minimal second-strike capability. Despite recent Chinese bravado, not only is it **hard to imagine a scenario** in which China would use nuclear weapons in response to conventional hostilities, but U.S. retaliatory capabilities would make Chinese first-use **suicidal**. Continued modernization of its nuclear forces and massive quantitative superiority over China give the United States a far **more robust deterrent** posture vis-a -vis China than it ever possessed vis-a -vis the Soviet Union. Similarly, overwhelming U.S. nuclear **superiority** provides greater strategic security for our East Asian allies than U.S. nuclear capabilities ever provided for our European allies during the Cold War.

# Relations

**Your NATO impact is silly – it says that NATO’s countries are key, not the organization of NATO itself. They also have no specific scenario for a war, just generic claims of diplomacy solving.**

**Cooperation is resilient- shared values, economic ties, and issue specific cooperation**

**McCormick ‘6** (The War on Terror and Contemporary U.S.-European Relations James M. McCormick 1 1 Iowa State University ABSTRACT AU: James M. McCormick TI: The War on Terror and Contemporary U.S.-European Relations SO: Politics & Policy VL: 34 NO: 2 PG: 426-450 YR: 2006

**Even if the conceptual gap were to narrow only slightly** over U.S. foreign policy generally and terrorism particularly**, powerful international and domestic constraints remain, which may motivate both the United States and Europe to close the action gap**. In other words, certain existing constraints may actually serve as incentives to close the action gap between these two global actors in the near term. Some of these constraints result from the common ties that already exist, but others are unique to the United States and Europe.First, of course, the United States and Europe are still bound together by a set of underlying common values and beliefs that brought them together during the Cold War after World War II, albeit no longer with the Soviet Union acting as a lone star guiding policy formulation. Those common values and beliefs are hardly empty notions to the vast majority of Europeans and Americans, particularly not to the new European states that have escaped communist rule since the fall of the Berlin Wall. **How those values should be advanced will surely remain as a source of disagreement both within and between Europe and America, but those values will undoubtedly continue to serve as incentives for all parties to seek some policy accommodations**. Second, Europe and America are fundamentally tied by the significant economic links that serve as the "sticky power" (Mead 2004, 46-53; Mead 2005, 29-36) between them**. Indeed, economic ties remain very strong, despite recent political differences** and lingering disputes over access to both participants' markets (Drozdiak 2005**). Third, the often unspoken levels of cooperation on terrorism—for example, in the areas of law enforcement, intelligence matters, or the tracking of financial matters—remain in place, even in the face of more visible political differences over Iraq and the wider war on terrorism.** Moreover, the events of 3/11/04 in Madrid and 7/7/05 in London continue to provide very powerful incentives for this kind of transatlantic cooperation. In this sense, these different kinds of "ties that bind"—and continue to bind—should not be forgotten as important sources of momentum to seek common ground between America and Europe.

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